Contents. Need for secrecy In designing security systems, it is wise to assume that the details of the cryptographic algorithm are already available to the attacker. This is known as — ' only secrecy of the key provides security', or, reformulated as, ' the enemy knows the system'. The provides evidence that it can be difficult to keep the details of a widely used algorithm secret (see ). A key is often easier to protect (it's typically a small piece of information) than an encryption algorithm, and easier to change if compromised. Thus, the security of an encryption system in most cases relies on some key being kept secret.
Trying to keep keys secret is one of the most difficult problems in practical cryptography; see. An attacker who obtains the key (by, for example, theft, extortion, assault, torture, or ) can recover the original message from the encrypted data, and issue signatures. Key scope Keys are generated to be used with a given suite of algorithms, called a. Encryption algorithms which use the same key for both encryption and decryption are known as. A newer class of 'public key' cryptographic algorithms was invented in the 1970s. These use a pair of keys —or keypair— a public key and a private one.
Public keys are used for encryption or signature verification; private ones decrypt and sign. The design is such that finding out the private key is extremely difficult, even if the corresponding public key is known. As that design involves lengthy computations, a keypair is often used to an on-the-fly symmetric key, which will only be used for the current session. And are two popular public-key cryptosystems; DSA keys can only be used for signing and verifying, not for encryption. Ownership and revocation Part of the security brought about by cryptography concerns confidence about who signed a given document, or who replies at the other side of a connection. Assuming that keys are not compromised, that question consists of determining the owner of the relevant public key. To be able to tell a key's owner, public keys are often enriched with attributes such as names, addresses, and similar identifiers.
The packed collection of a public key and its attributes can be digitally signed by one or more supporters. In the model, the resulting object is called a and is signed by a (CA). In the model, it is still called a 'key', and is signed by various people who personally verified that the attributes match the subject. In both PKI and PGP models, compromised keys can be revoked.
Revocation has the side effect of disrupting the relationship between a key's attributes and the subject, which may still be valid. In order to have a possibility to recover from such disruption, signers often use different keys for everyday tasks: Signing with an intermediate certificate (for PKI) or a subkey (for PGP) facilitates keeping the principal private key in an offline safe. Deleting a key on purpose to make the data inaccessible is called. Key sizes. Main article: For the system the key must be at least as long as the message. In encryption systems that use a algorithm, messages can be much longer than the key. The key must, however, be long enough so that an attacker cannot try all possible combinations.
A key length of 80 bits is generally considered the minimum for strong security with symmetric encryption algorithms. 128-bit keys are commonly used and considered very strong. See the article for a more complete discussion. The keys used in have some mathematical structure. For example, public keys used in the system are the product of two prime numbers.
Thus public key systems require longer key lengths than symmetric systems for an equivalent. 3072 bits is the suggested key length for systems based on and integer which aim to have security equivalent to a 128 bit symmetric cipher. May allow smaller-size keys for equivalent security, but these algorithms have only been known for a relatively short time and current estimates of the difficulty of searching for their keys may not survive. As of 2004, a message encrypted using a 109-bit key elliptic curve algorithm had been broken by brute force. The current rule of thumb is to use an ECC key twice as long as the symmetric key security level desired. Except for the random, the security of these systems has not (as of 2008 ) been proven mathematically, so a theoretical breakthrough could make everything one has encrypted an open book. This is another reason to err on the side of choosing longer keys.
Key choice To prevent a key from being guessed, keys need to be generated truly and contain sufficient. The problem of how to safely generate truly random keys is difficult, and has been addressed in many ways by various cryptographic systems. There is a on (, Randomness Requirements for Security). Some operating systems include tools for 'collecting' entropy from the timing of unpredictable operations such as head movements. For the production of small amounts of keying material, ordinary provide a good source of high quality randomness.
Key vs Password For most computer security purposes and for most users, 'key' is not synonymous with ' (or '), although a password can in fact be used as a key. The primary practical difference between keys and passwords is that the latter are intended to be generated, read, remembered, and reproduced by a human user (although nowadays the user may delegate those tasks to ). A key, by contrast, is intended for use by the software that is implementing the cryptographic algorithm, and so human readability etc. Is not required.
In fact, most users will, in most cases, be unaware of even the existence of the keys being used on their behalf by the security components of their everyday software applications. If a is used as an encryption key, then in a well-designed crypto system it would not be used as such on its own. This is because passwords tend to be human-readable and,hence, may not be particularly strong. To compensate, a good crypto system will use the password-acting-as-key not to perform the primary encryption task itself, but rather to act as an input to a (KDF). That KDF uses the password as a starting point from which it will then generate the actual secure encryption key itself.
Various methods such as adding a and may be used in the generation. See also.
Software is digital through and through, and yet there's one unavoidable aspect of software installation that remains thoroughly analog: entering the registration key. The aggravation is intentional. Unique registration keys exist only to prevent piracy. Like all piracy solutions- short of completely server hosted applications and games, where piracy means you'd have to host your own rogue server- it's an incomplete client-side solution. How effective is it?
One vendor implemented code to detect false registration keys and phone home with some basic information such as the IP address when these false keys are entered. Software Connectivity Ratio of pirated to legitimate keys no internet connection required 45: 1 occasional internet connection necessary 60: 1 internet must be 'always on' 110: 1 I have no idea how reliable this data is. The vendor is never named, and given that the title of the URL is, I'd expect it to be biased.
But it is data, and without the registration key concept (and pervasive internet connectivity), we'd have no data whatsoever to quantify how much piracy actually exists. The BSA in 2006, but it is just that- an estimate. I'll choose biased data over no data whatsoever, every time. I don't have a problem with registration keys. You could, in fact, argue that registration key validation actually works. Microsoft recently stated that, largely due to improvements in their - Microsoft's global registration key validation service.
As a software developer, I can empathize with Microsoft to a degree. Unless you oppose the very concept of commercial software, there has to be some kind of enforcement in place. The digital nature of software makes it both easy and impersonal for people to avoid paying (note that I did not say 'steal'), which is an irresistible combination for many. Unless you provide some disincentives, that's exactly what people will do- they'll pay nothing for your software. Microsoft's history with piracy goes way, way back- all the way back to the original microcomputers. Witness Bill Gates', written in 1976. Almost a year ago, Paul Allen and myself, expecting the hobby market to expand, hired Monte Davidoff and developed Altair BASIC.
Though the initial work took only two months, the three of us have spent most of the last year documenting, improving and adding features to BASIC. Now we have 4K, 8K, EXTENDED, ROM and DISK BASIC. The value of the computer time we have used exceeds $40,000. The feedback we have gotten from the hundreds of people who say they are using BASIC has all been positive.
Two surprising things are apparent, however, 1) Most of these 'users' never bought BASIC (less than 10% of all Altair owners have bought BASIC), and 2) The amount of royalties we have received from sales to hobbyists makes the time spent on Altair BASIC worth less than $2 an hour. As the majority of hobbyists must be aware, most of you steal your software. Hardware must be paid for, but software is something to share. Who cares if the people who worked on it get paid?
Is this fair? One thing you don't do by stealing software is get back at MITS for some problem you may have had. MITS doesn't make money selling software. The royalty paid to us, the manual, the tape and the overhead make it a break-even operation. One thing you do do is prevent good software from being written. Who can afford to do professional work for nothing?
What hobbyist can put 3-man years into programming, finding all bugs, documenting his product and distribute for free? The fact is, no one besides us has invested a lot of money in hobby software.
We have written 6800 BASIC, and are writing 8080 APL and 6800 APL, but there is very little incentive to make this software available to hobbyists. Most directly, the thing you do is theft. Although computers have changed radically in the last thirty years, human behavior hasn't. (Alternately, you could argue that the economics of computing and the emergence of an ad-supported software ecosystem have fundamentally changed the rules of the game since 1976. But that's a topic for another blog post.) I accept that software registration keys are a necessary evil for commercial software, and I resign myself to manually keeping track of them, and keying them in. But why do they have to be so painful?
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You do realize a human being has to type this stuff in, right? Here are some things that I've seen vendors get wrong with their registration key process:. Using commonly mistaken characters in the key Quick! Is that an 'O' or an '0'? A '6' or a 'G'? An 'I' or an 'l'?
A 'B' or an '8'? At least have the courtesy to scour your registration key character set of those characters that are commonly mistaken for other characters. And please print the key in a font that minimizes the chances of confusion. Excessively long keys The most rudimentary grasp of mathematics tells us that a conservative 10 character alphanumeric registration key is good for 197 trillion unique users.
Even, we can estimate about 14 million random registration key combinations before we have a 50 percent risk of a collision. So why, then, do software developers insist on 20+ character registration keys? It's ridiculous. Are they planning to sell licenses to every grain of sand on every beach?. Not separating the key into blocks Rather than smashing your key into one long string, make it a group of small 4 to 5 characters, separated by a delimiter. It's the same reason phone numbers are listed as 404-555-1212 and not:.
Making it difficult to enter the key Short of providing every customer a handy USB barcode scanner, at least make the registration key entry form as user friendly as possible:. Let the user enter the key in any format. With dashes, without dashes, using spaces, whatever. Accept a variety of formats. Do not provide five input boxes that require us to tab through each one to enter the key. Tell me as soon as I've entered a bad value in the key.
Why should I have to go back and pore over my entry to figure out which letter or number I've screwed up? You're the computer, remember? This is what you're good. Accept pasting from the clipboard. Once we've installed the software, we'll probably install it again, and nobody likes keying these annoying resgistration keys in more than once. I've seen some clever software that proactively checks the clipboard and enters the key automatically if it finds it there. (Kudos to you,.).
Don't passively-aggressively inform me that 'the key you entered appears to be valid.' What's the point of unique registration keys if you can't be sure? I guess paying customers can't be trusted. Where's the%.@# key? The key is important. Without it we can't install or use the software.
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So why is it buried in the back of the manual, or on an easy-to-overlook interior edge of the package? Make it easy to find- and difficult to lose. Provide multiple copies of the key in different locations, maybe even as a peelable sticker we can place somewhere useful.
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And if the software was delivered digitally, please keep track of our key for us. We're forgetful. Software registration keys are a disconcerting analog hoop we force users to jump through when using commercial software. Furthermore, registration keys are often the user's first experience with our software- and first impressions matter. If you're delivering software that relies on registration keys, give that part of the experience some consideration. Any negative feelings generated by an unnecessarily onerous registration key entry process will tend to color users' perception of your software.
PIN pad installation instructions Installing a PIN pad These instructions are provided as general guidelines for installing a PIN pad for use with Microsoft Dynamics Retail Management System (RMS). The actual steps for your device might happen in a slightly different order, include additional or fewer steps, or vary in other ways. Consult the installation instructions provided by the device manufacturer for details.
Make sure the PIN pad has been enabled by your acquiring bank. The bank will add an encryption key for the security of your transactions. This process, sometimes referred to as 'key injection,' can take up to several weeks. When the PIN pad is ready to be installed, turn off the computer. Unpack the PIN pad from its packaging and make sure all the parts are there. In addition to the PIN pad, these parts might include a power cable or AC adapter, a USB or serial cable for connecting the device to the computer, and an installation CD-ROM.
Note: If the USB or serial cable is not included, be sure to obtain the exact cable recommended by the manufacturer. Connect one end of the USB or serial cable to an available port on the computer. If necessary, connect the other end of the USB or serial cable to the PIN pad. If necessary, connect the power cable or AC adapter either to the PIN pad or to the serial port connector. Note: A USB PIN pad might not have a separate power cable; instead, it takes its power from the computer via the USB port.
Plug the other end of the power cable or AC adapter into an electrical outlet. Turn on the computer. If Windows detects the new hardware and starts the New Hardware Wizard, cancel the wizard. Note: If an error occurs during the Windows hardware detection process, you can probably ignore the error.
Install the OPOS service object and set the name for the device. If a CD-ROM was provided by the device manufacturer, insert the CD-ROM into the disk drive on the computer, and then follow the on-screen instructions. If a CD-ROM was not provided by the device manufacturer, contact the manufacturer to obtain the correct OPOS service object. If an OPOS service object is not available for the device, such as for an older legacy device, you might be able to use the OPOS service object that is included with Microsoft Dynamics RMS. For more information, return to the tutorial and click OPOS controls and setting up device software. To test the device, run the test or 'check health' utility provided with the device, or follow the manufacturer's testing instructions.
If a test utility was not provided, you can run the test included in the OPOS utility described in 'OPOS controls and setting up device software.' If the device is not working, STOP HERE.
Make sure the device is connected properly and plugged into an electrical outlet. If you still cannot get it to work, contact the manufacturer. Configure the device in Microsoft Dynamics RMS. In Store Operations Manager, open the properties window for the register where the device is installed.
On the PIN Pad tab, select the check box to enable the device, enter the device name, and then enter the transaction host ID that was provided by the manufacturer. For more information, return to the tutorial and click View instructions for configuring devices in Microsoft Dynamics RMS. Set up debit card processing in Microsoft Dynamics RMS. For more information, see 'Integrating EDC software' in Store Operations Administrator Online Help. To test the device with Microsoft Dynamics RMS, log on to Store Operations POS, and then tender a transaction using a debit card tender type. For instructions on how to do this with minimal change to your store data, return to the tutorial and click Learn about testing devices in Microsoft Dynamics RMS.